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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

On

September

14,

2009, the Plaintiffs/Appellents

Jefri

and Debbie Davis, executed a

Buyer’s Representation Agreement with Defendants/Respondents

House Company doing business
V01.

I,

p, 363,

1]

T0
improved

Who was

this end,

Mr.

an agent for Broker.

Tuma worked

real property located at

“Subj ect Property”). m. at p. 364, ﬂ

IQ. at

to the Subj ect Property as

is

984 Gray Wolf Road, Moyie Springs, Idaho, (hereinafter the
3.

In so doing, Mr.

Tuma mistakenly believed, and so informed

I_d.

at pp.

was provided Via a road by
it

northwest corner.

It is

the

name 0f

undisputed,

identiﬁed 0n two surveys, one of Which was in the chain of title

an attachment t0 covenants recorded against the property, which clearly

identify the access being through an easement

corner.

Defendant Charles

with the Davises toward the purchase 0f a parcel of

enters the Subject Property near

however, that the legal access

real estate agent,

(R.

2.

11

the Davises, that the legal access to the Subject Property

Gray Wolf Road Which

of Johnson

Banker Resort Realty (hereinafter the “Broker”).

The Davises worked With Idaho licensed

1).

John (“CJ”) Tuma,

as Coldwell

Don McCanlies

Which

enters the Subj ect Property near

its

southwest

364-365, 1W 6-10.

Jessica Fairchild,

0n behalf 0f Community

DaVises’ purchase ofthe Subject Property.

Title,

IQ. at p.

364,

LLC, acted

1]

5.

On December 7, 2009, Ms.

sent an email to the Davises through their daughter Terah Davis,

purchase of the Subject Property.

I_d.

at p.

Boundary Line Survey Which depicts the

365,

1]

11.

as the closing agent for the

Attached t0

who

this

Fairchild

assisted her parents in the

email was attached to the the

legal access t0 the property. IQ. at

ﬂ

10.

This survey also

shows

that

Property

is

Gray Wolf Road does not extend t0 the Subj ect Property, and that access

through an easement from Highway 2 over the southwest corner 0f Tract 3A.

On May

2018, the Davises brought

10,

suit against the

in the course ofhis representation

of the Subject Property.

that the

IQ. at pp. 7-18.

asserting

made by Mr. Tuma

The Respondents subsequently moved

for the

District

summary

Court granted

DaVises claims were barred by the statute 0f limitations as the underlying

causes 0f action began to accrue no later than 2010.

week

ILL

0f the Davises as their real estate agent leading up t0 the purchase

judgment dismissal of the Davises claims on various grounds, a motion the

0n the basis

Tuma

Broker and Mr.

claims of fraud and constructive fraud regarding the representations allegedly

A

to the Subject

before the

summary judgment

IQ. at p.

369.

hearing, the Davises ﬁled a

Motion

t0

Amend

Complaint and a Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, seeking t0 add claims for breach 0f contract

and

illegal practice

Motions.

1g. at p.

of law, abstracting, and surveying. The District Court denied the Davises’

373.

This appeal followed.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The DaVises’ Opening Brief raises two basic

when

it

denied the DaVises’ Motion t0

actual or constructive

ON APPEAL

issues: (1)

Amend their Complaint,

knowledge 0f the

fact that

whether the District Court erred

and

(2)

whether the DaVises had

Gray Wolf Road did not provide

legal access to

their property in 2009.

The DaVises’ Opening Brief also

by Tuma prevented

raises the issue

of whether the fraud allegedly committed

the District Court from ﬁnding that the DaVises

had constructive knowledge

that they did not

sought

summary judgment from the District Court was Whether the Davises would be able t0 prove

Tuma knew his

each element 0f their fraud claim, and speciﬁcally the element that
the Davises to be false.

free

Tuma

have legal access over Gray Wolf Road. One of the grounds 0n Which

The

District

Court did not rule 0n

review 0f motions for summary judgment and

Tuma

alternative grounds,

knowledge

fails

Court exercises

the decisions 0f a lower court

0n

Either way, the DaVises’ argument that they did not have

and the

III.

The DaVises

may afﬁrm

this

asks this Court t0 consider whether the DaVises’ fraud claims would

have survived summary judgment.
constructive

Because

this issue.

statements to

District Court’s ruling should

be afﬁrmed.

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

are not entitled t0 attorney’s fees

Representation Agreement (R. V01.

I,

p.

1

10,

1]

0n appeal.

They claim

that the Buyer’s

12) provides for attorney’s fees in “any suit 0r other

proceeding arising out 0f this Agreement.” This appeal, and the claims before the District Court,
did not arise out 0f the Buyer’s Representation Agreement.

Tuma’s Motion
their

Complaint

pp. 276-277.

that

for

t0

Summary Judgment,

add a claim

that

the DaVises

moved the

District

Court for leave

t0

amend

Tuma breached the Buyer’s Representation Agreement.

That motion was denied. m. pp.

were before the

Seven days before the hearing on

IQ. at

373.

Consequently, this appeal, and the claims

District Court, did not arise out

0f a breach 0f the Buyer’s Representation

Agreement, and the DaVises

may not

at

seek attorney’s fees thereunder.

ARGUMENT

IV.

The

A.

Court’s Denial 0f The Davises’ Motion t0

District

Amend

Their

Complaint Should Be Afﬁrmed.
Fifty—three days after the deadline t0 ﬁle

amended pleadings imposed by

the District

Court’s Pretrial Scheduling Order, and seven days before the time set for hearing 0n Tuma’s

Motion

for

Summary Judgment,

a Motion for Leave t0 File an
original claims of fraud

the Davises ﬁled a

Amended

Motion

for Relief

Complaint. (R. V01.

I,

from the

to

Motion

for

Leave

District Court’s decision

I_d.

at pp.

and denied the Davises’ Motion for Relief from the

to File

Amended

an

Complaint.

at p. 373.

I_d.

denying their Motion for Leave

t0

T0

their

add claims for breach 0f

contract and for the unlicensed practice 0f law, surveying, 0r abstracting.

the

Order and

pp. 259-289; 292-294).

and misrepresentation, the Davises sought

District Court considered

Pretrial

276-277. The

Pretrial

Order and

The Davises now appeal

Amend. For

the

the reasons set forth

below, this Court should afﬁrm the District Court.
I

.

The Davises Make

N0 Attempt t0 Address

When Evaluating a Claimed Abuse
The Davises’ argument
to

Amend

is

that the District

the Factors this Court Considers

ofDiscretion.

Court abused

its

discretion in denying the

conclusory and fatally deﬁcient. This Court has often stated:

“We Will

not consider

assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.”

Hogg V. Wolske, 142 Idaho

See

e.g.,

549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). “In order t0 be considered

this Court, the appellant is required t0 identify legal issues

arguments in the opening

Motion

brief.”

and provide

Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 35.

by

authorities supporting the

In this case, the Davises note in their Appeal Brief that a decision t0 allow an

to the pleadings is

this

reviewed for an abuse of discretion but failed to

Court considers

When reviewing such

set forth 0r

a decision.1 Appellant’s Brief, p.

6.

amendment

apply the factors

For the reasons

set

forth below, these failures are fatal to the Davises’ appeal.

In State V. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583,

found dispositive on appeal the appellant’s
abused

its

discretion.

Li

at

589 n.2 (2017),

failure t0 explain its theory as to

this

Court

how the District Court

575, 388 P.3d at 589. This Court emphasized that

When

a party:

[D]oes not contend that the district court failed t0 perceive the issue
one 0f discretion, that the district court failed t0 act within the

as

boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0
court did not reach

its

conclusory argument
lg. at

575

n.2,

388 P.3d

at

589 n.2

is

decision

it

0r that the district

by an exercise of reason, such a

“fatally deficient” t0 the party’s case.

(internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Cummings

V.

Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016)).
In

0f review,

Cummings,

much

this

Court held that the defendant did “not identify the applicable standard

less attempt t0

apply

it.”

Cummings, 160 Idaho

at

853, 380 P.3d at 174. This

Court further noted:

Cummings makes n0 attempt t0 address the matters we consider
When evaluating a claimed abuse of discretion. He does not contend
that the district court failed to perceive the issue as

one of discretion,
of this

that the district court failed t0 act Within the boundaries

discretion and consistent With the legal standards applicable to the

1

When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse 0f discretion, this Court must analyze

“Whether the

trial court:

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted

consistently With the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to
the exercise ofreason.”

Lunneborg

V.

MV Fun Life,

it;

and (4) reached

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

its

decision

by

speciﬁc choices available t0
its

I_d.

decision

by an

it

0r that the district court did not reach

exercise of reason.

(citations omitted).

In both

Cummings and Kralovec,

this

Court held that Where a party completely

address the abuse 0f discretion factors, the assignment of error

deﬁcient t0 the party’s case. Like the appellants in

is

fails t0

conclusory and therefore fatally

Cummings and Kralovec,

the DaVises d0 not

argue that the District Court failed t0 perceive the issue as one 0f discretion, that the District Court
failed t0 act within the boundaries

0f

this discretion

applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

by an

it

and consistent With the legal standards

0r that the District Court did not reach

its

decision

exercise 0f reason.

It

should be noted that

this

Court has clariﬁed that Cummings and Kralovec d0 not “require

a formalistic recitation 0f the standard 0f review.”

P.3d 683, 690—91 (2019).

State V. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 869—70,

In Jeske, this Court stated that

its

“main concerns

conclusory arguments, lack of authority to support those arguments, 0r failure to
to address the factors this

436

are the use of

make any attempt

Court considers.” E. Although the appellant in Jeske failed t0

set forth

the standard of review in his opening brief, this Court nevertheless considered his argument

because:

...he clearly

argued regarding “whether the lower court acted Within

the boundaries 0f such discretion and consistently With any legal

standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices before
the legal standard that
district court

by

was applicable

citing I.C.R. 7(6), Idaho

it.”

He

identiﬁed

t0 the choices before the

Code

section 19-1420, and

relevant case law. Next, Jeske presented an analysis of

how

the

above stated authority was not followed by the district court.
Therefore, his was not merely a conclusory argument, as was this

Cummings and

Court’s concern in

that the district court failed to

Kralovec. Rather, Jeske argued

comply With the second and

third

prongs 0f the abuse 0f discretion standard.

m,

164 Idaho

at 870,

436 P.3d

at

691 (citations omitted).

Thus, While Jeske provides that the DaVises’ failure t0 recite the four prongs 0f the abuse

0f discretion standard

is

not fatal in and of

District

Court abused

make any

the DaVises’ failure t0

When reviewing

address the factors this Court considers
distinguishes this case

itself,

attempt t0

a decision for an abuse of discretion

from Jeske. Like Cummings and Kralovec, the DaVises’ argument

its

discretion

is

that the

conclusory and fatally deﬁcient t0 their case. Therefore, this

Court should not consider the DaVises’ assignment 0f error.
2.

The Davises Failed

t0

Appeal the Denial 0ftheir Motionfor Relieffrom the

Pretrial Order.

Although the Davises have appealed the

District Court’s denial

0f their Motion

to

Amend

Complaint, they did not appeal the District Court’s denial 0f their Motion for Relief from the
Pretrial Order. This, also, is fatal to their appeal.

The question of Whether

to grant a

motion

t0

amend

the pleadings

from the question of Whether to grant a motion for relief from a pretrial
to

amend

relief

is

separate and distinct

order. In general, a

motion

seeks to add or remove facts, claims, 0r defenses t0 the pleadings, while a motion for

from a

pretrial order asks the court for

permission t0 deviate from deadlines or other

requirements imposed by the Court and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 16.

The

factors a court

must consider

pleading should be freely granted

for each

“when justice

motion are also

distinct.

A motion to amend a

so requires.” I.R.C.P. 15(a).

“A

trial

court

may

consider whether the

amended pleading

sets out a valid claim,

whether the opposing party would

be prejudiced by any undue delay, 0r Whether the opposing party has an available defense to the

newly added claim.” Black Canyon Racquetball Club,

Inc. V.

Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119

Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). Other factors include undue delay, bad faith 0r dilatory

motive 0n part of the movant, repeated

amendment. Smith

V.

The standard
motion

failure to cure deﬁciencies

by amendment, and

futility

of

Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305 (1977).

for considering a

t0 extend the deadline t0 ﬁle

motion for

relief

amended pleadings,

from a

is set

pretrial order,

forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a)(3). That rule

provides that the deadline t0 ﬁle amended pleadings “must not be
court 0n a showing 0f good cause 0r

by

stipulation

and speciﬁcally a

modiﬁed except by leave 0f the

and approval 0f the court.”

lg.

A district court's decision regarding Whether t0 consider a late-ﬁled motion for relief under
Rule 16

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion. Prehn

876, 881 (2016).

constitutes

to

Although

it

does not appear that

good cause under Rule

mean something more

16,

it

this

V.

Hodge, 161 Idaho 321, 326, 385 P.3d

Court has provided guidance as t0 What

has been held in relation to other rules of civil procedure

than excusable neglect. See,

e.g.,

Taylor

V.

Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695,

699, 302 P.3d 35, 39 (2013) (good cause for untimely service 0f process requires

more than

excusable neglect).
In this case, the Davises ﬁled their motion for leave t0

after the expiration

0f the deadline to submit amended pleadings provided by the District Court’s

Pretrial Order. (R. V01.

merits 0f the

new

amend the complaint ﬁfty-three days

I,

pp. 259; 50-5 1). Clearly, the DaVises recognized that, regardless 0f the

claims set forth in their Proposed

Amended

Complaint, they would need t0

demonstrate good cause for submitting

amended

pleadings.

under Rule

t0 the

I,

In their opening brief

I,

Appellant ’s Brief, pp. 6-7.
t0

on appeal, the Davises have limited

Amend.

.

(“It

its

from

those grounds

a lower court

is

V. Riley,

Gra_zian,

makes a

District Court t0

that the District

ruling based

0n two

challenged on appeal, the appellate court

Amend.

deny the Davis’s

Court abused
this

to

its

discretion in

Court t0 provide any

alternative grounds

M

144 Idaho 510, 517—18, 164 P.3d 790, 797—98 (2007);

one of the grounds

may be

(When

in error is

a decision

is

the District Court, because the ruling

is

m

afﬁrm 0n the uncontested

basis.”

MacLeod V. Reed, 126 Idaho

669,

“based upon alternative grounds, the

0f no consequence and

may be

judgment can be sustained upon one 0f the other grounds”). Taylor requires

disregarded

this

if the

Court to afﬁrm

based 0n two alternative grounds and the Davises only

challenge one 0f those grounds in this appeal.

Complaint without also obtaining relief from the
for the untimely

and only one 0f

162 Idaho 692, 702, 403 P.3d 636, 646 (2017) (emphasis added) (citing

671, 889 P.2d 103, 105 (Ct.App.1995).

fact that

Motion

to the

that ruling.

“Where

Taylor

argument solely

discretion in denying the

was an abuse 0f discretion for the

They d0 not contend

.”).

their

denying their Motion for Relief from the Pretrial Order nor do they ask
relief

of the deadline to ﬁle

p. 373).

question of Whether the District Court abused

Motion

after the expiration

pp. 292-294). After oral argument, the District Court issued a written

decision denying both motions. (R. V01.

(sic)

Court

Consequently, they ﬁled a separate motion t0 extend the pretrial deadlines

(R. V01.

16.

it

The DaVises could not have amended

Pretrial

their

Order by showing that good cause existed

motion and that justice required the amended complaint t0 be heard. This remains

true regardless

0f the merits 0f the additional claims sought to be added 0r any error committed by

the District Court With respect to

its

ruling

0n the Motion

Amend. Consequently,

t0

this

Court

should afﬁrm the District Court ruling.

3.

Obviousfrom the Record that the District Court Found the
had Expired 0n the Proposed Amended Claims.

It is

Statute 0f

Limitations

The DaVises argue

Amend their Complaint.

that the District

Court abused

They ask this Court to remand the

whether the claims

issue

to

amend are obvious from the

a discretionary decision,
the case.”

back t0 the

set forth in the Plaintiff’s

This Court need not grant such

motion

discretion in denying their

Motion

t0

Speciﬁcally, they argue that the District Court “failed t0 analyze Whether

the proposed additional statutory or contractual claims

6.

its

and

DAFCO LLC V.

relief,

were time barred.

District

.”

Appellant ’s Brief,

.

p.

Court with instructions t0 determine

Proposed Amended Complaint are time barred.
because the reasons that the District Court denied the

record. “If a district court fails t0 enumerate

the reasons are n_0t

its

reasons for

obviousfrom the record, the Court will remand

Stewart Title Guar. C0., 156 Idaho 749, 756, 331 P.3d 491, 498 (2014)

(emphasis added) (citing Quick V. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 772—73, 727 P.2d 1187, 1200—01 (1986)).

By

negative inference, the Court will not remand the case if the reasons

record. This Court has further held that a court’s recitation of

be lengthy and

may consist

689 P.2d 216, 221

(Ct.

its

ﬂ

obvious from the

reasons for a decision need not

0f brief remarks in open court. Bailey

V. Bailey,

107 Idaho 324, 329,

App. 1984); see also Cummings, supra.

The record demonstrates
Davises’ claims were barred

by

that the District

Court was clearly of the opinion that

all

0f the

the statute 0f limitations, including the proposed claims set forth

10

in

its

Motion to

Motions

Amend Complaint. At the outset 0f the December 7, 2018 hearing 0n the DaVises’

Amend and for Relief from the Pretrial

t0

Order the judge

stated:

THE COURT: And we also have a motion by the plaintiffs asking to shorten
time and t0 grant leave t0 ﬁle an amended complaint t0 add a couple 0f additional
clients.

And I think what I need t0
ﬁle,

I

asked

and

I

need

t0 hear,

I

think,

from you

I

don’t

talking about a sale that occurred in

know 0f any — I know of two—year

ﬁve year — but we’re beyond any
that

we

at the

is I

can’t see any

it.

way that

telling

statute

2009 and we’re nine years

statute

out,

of limitations, three years, a

0f limitations. So

I

just don’t see

any way

get around that.

So, Mr. Bauer,

me

that

I

don’t think Mr. McLaughlin needs t0 waste a lot 0f time

because I’m very familiar with the statute 0f limitations and their

absolute bar, and

I

don’t

MR. BAUER:

know how we

get around them.

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You May.
I,

looked

get around the statute of limitations.

We’re

(Tr. V01.

it is, I

my staff attorney t0 g0 through the ﬁle and we met and talked about

And, Mr. Bauer, what

we

say in this case, in looking at

pp. 5-6).

11

May I

speak t0 that?

Mr. Bauer then went 0n

t0 argue that the doctrine

exception t0 the statute of limitations. m. at p.
estoppel and attempted to apply

them

10-19.

6, L.

to the facts

0f equitable estoppel provided an

He

outlined the elements 0f equitable

of the case and referred the court to Ferro

Soc'V of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 149 P.3d 813 (2006). (Tr. V01.

Bauer argued
for fraud

that if Ferro

can provide relief from the

and constructive fraud,

the proposed

it

statute

I,

p. 8, L. 2-9). Finally,

V.

Mr.

0f limitations With regard t0 claims

should also provide relief from the statute 0f limitations as to

amended claims 0f breach 0f contract

or unlicensed practices. IQ. at p. 10, L. 11-21.
clients relief from the statutes

Aside from the argument that equitable estoppel provided his

of limitations, Mr. Bauer offered no other reason why the court should allow the proposed amended

The court then allowed counsel

Claims.

directing the court’s attention t0

V01.

I,

p. 13, L. 3-11).

Knudsen

for

V.

Tuma

by their representations 0r conduct, kept

from pursuing

argued that there

is

n0 evidence

that

to respond,

is

available to a

at

779, 918 P.2d 1224.

Tuma’s conduct prevented
(Tr. V01.

I,

(Tr.

the plaintiff from pursuing

Knudsen 128 Idaho

their claims during the limitation period.

Bauer was given an opportunity

Tuma began by

Agee, 128 Idaho 776, 918 P.2d 1221 (1996).

a cause of action during the limitation period.”

Tuma

Counsel for

In that case, this Court held that “[e]quitable estoppel

plaintiff When the defendants,

Counsel for

t0 respond.

p. 13, L. 23-25).

the DaVises

When

Mr.

he presented no evidence in support of equitable

estoppel.

It is

obvious from the record that the District Court was not persuaded by the DaVises’

equitable estoppel argument:

12

THE COURT:
have

beyond the

t0 get

estoppel claims as Mr.

taking t0 try t0

you.
(Tr. V01.

I,

And

I

—

t0

The problem I’m having
statute

McLaughlin — there has

don’t see that

p. 34, L.

sit

on your

we have

is

then t0 d0

that,

you

And I’m not seeing for your equitable

0f limitations.

have you

there though

to

be some action that the person

rights, t0 try t0

kind of conceal

it

is

from

that here.

22-25; p. 35, L. 1-4).

And:

THE COURT:
action

is

Again, Iwill issue a written decision, but

barred by the statute 0f limitations. Idon’t see any

I

believe that this

way we

get

beyond

it.

lg. at p. 36, L. 17-20.

And

ﬁnally:

THE COURT:

But

there’s

n0 use unnecessarily prolonging an action

that

appears t0 be clearly barred by the statute of limitations.

So
I_d.

that’s the Court’s thinking.

And

I’ll

issue a written decision.

at p. 9, L. 2-9.

Although the

District Court’s

Memorandum

reasons for denying the Davises’ Motion to
Order,

it is

Amend

Decision did not speciﬁcally address
or the

Motion

for Relief

from the

Pretrial

obvious from the record that the court found that the statute of limitations barred

the DaVises’ claims, including those sought t0 be added in the

amended complaint.

obvious that the court did not ﬁnd that equitable estoppel applied in

this case,

its

all

It is

of

also

which was the only

exception t0 the statute of limitations put forward by the Davises in support of their proposed

13

amended claims. Bailey instructs that the District Court’ s remarks
satisfy the requirement that the reasoning

at the

December 7, 20 1 8 hearing

behind a discretionary decision should be disclosed and

for this reason the District Court’s ruling should

be afﬁrmed.

District Court Properly Found that the Statutes 0f Limitations Had Run
on the Davises’ Claims.

The

B.

The only remaining

issues raised

by the Davises

in this appeal are

whether they had actual

0r constructive notice 0f the facts giving rise t0 their claims for fraud, constructive fraud, and

negligence. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-12.

disputed issues 0f material fact for

trial as t0

Gray Wolf Road did not provide access
acquired

title

to the property.

The

(R. V01.

I,

District

Court found that there were n0 genuinely

Whether the Davises had constructive knowledge that

t0 their property as

p. 373).

0f October

1,

2009, the date they

Consequently, the District Court ruled that the

Davises’ claims for fraud and constructive fraud (hereafter, collectively referred t0 as ‘the fraud
claims’) were barred

by Idaho Code

(I.C.) § 5-218(4).

(R. Vol.

I,

p. 369).

The District Court also found that the Davises had actual knowledge 0fthe
to the fraud claims

on December

Finally, the District Court

may have been

implicitly pled,

For the reasons

7,

2009.

IQ.

found that the Davises’ claims for negligence,

were barred by

set forth

facts giving rise

I.C. § 5-224. IQ. at pp.

t0 the extent they

371-372.

below, this Court should afﬁrm the grant 0f summary judgment.
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The District Court Properly Found that any Negligence Claims, t0 the
Extent they were Implicitly Pled by the Davises, were Barred by the Statute

I.

0fLimz'tati0ns.

The Davises argue

in Section

D

of their opening brief that the District Court erred in

dismissing the negligence claims because they did not have actual or constructive notice that there

was a problem With
p. 12.

there

their access

With regard to the
is

n0

statute

statute

V. Runft,

the

home

0r thereafter. Appellant’s Brief,

0f limitations on negligence claims,

this

Court has held “[b]ecause

of limitations speciﬁcally governing negligence actions that do not involve

personal injury 0r malpractice,

Jones

When they purchased

Leroy,

Cofﬁn

we

apply the four-year statute 0f limitations found in

&

Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 613, 873 P.2d 861, 867

I.C. §

5-224.”

(1994).

The Davises’ negligence claims do not involve personal

injury or malpractice. In fact, as

the District Court noted, the Davises did not set forth in their Complaint a claim for negligence at

all.

(R. V01.

I,

p. 371).

pled a claim that

The

Tuma was

such claim was barred by

District Court properly

found

that, to the extent the

Davises implicitly

negligent in the performance of his duties as their real estate agent,

I.C. § 5-224.

The

I_d.

District

Court observed that under Idaho law:

“[In order t]0 determine Whether this statute 0f limitations bars the

claim, [the Court]

occurred.

must determine when the ﬁrst negligent

act

This analysis focuses upon the acts complained 0f and

does not require an analysis of When the plaintiff discovered either
the acts complained 0f 0r the

damage

resulting

from those

acts.”

m., (citing Jones, 125 Idaho at 613, 873 P.2d at 867 (citations omitted).

The

District

Court then found that

reviewing and interpreting the

title

it

was undisputed

that

any negligent act by

Tuma

commitment, CCRs, and surveys must have occurred n0

15

in

later

than October

1,

2009, which

is

the date the Davises acquired the Subject Property. IQ.

Court concluded, therefore, that any negligence claims began accruing on October
pursuant to

I.C. §

5-224, lapsed four years

Complaint was ﬁled.

I_d.

at pp.

later,

on October

1,

The
1,

District

2009 and,

2013, nearly ﬁve years before the

371-372.

In this appeal, the Davises appear t0 be asking this Court t0 apply the discovery rule set

forth in

LC.

§

5-219 t0 their implicitly pled claims for ordinary negligence. Unlike

§

5-224 does not accrue When the facts

at

613, 873 P.2d at 867. Rather, claims

which governs personal injury and malpractice claims, LC.
giving rise t0 the claim

governed by

§

become known.

m,

5—224 accrue when the negligent act occurred.

the Davises obtained actual or constructive

t0 their property is irrelevant

claims under Idaho law.
to the location

discovered.

125 Idaho

knowledge

that

I_d.

Consequently, the date

claim accrued

when

Gray Wolf Road did not provide access

with regard t0 a claim for negligence, as there

Any negligence

I.C. § 5-219,

at the

is

n0

tolling

0f such

time of Tuma’s alleged mistake as

of the legal access, not When truth of those representations was 0r could have been

There

is

n0 dispute

occurred before October
claims expired, at the

1,

latest,

that

Tuma’s statements about access

2009, the date 0f closing.

Thus, the statute 0f limitations on these

four years from that date, Which

The Davises put forward no argument or

to the Subject Property

was October

1,

2013.

authority for applying the discovery rule

applicable t0 personal injury and malpractice claims t0 a claim 0f ordinary negligence, to the extent

any such claims were even pled. Consequently,

this

dismissing the DaVises’ negligence claims.
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Court should afﬁrm the District Court’s ruling

The District Court correctlyfound that the Davises had actual knowledge
that Gray WolfRoad did notprovide access t0 theirproperly 0n December

2.

7,

The

Wolf Road
title

2009.

Court found that the Davises were provided with actual knowledge that Gray

District

did not provide the legal access to their property when, 0n

December

ofﬁcer having emailed a copy 0f a survey showing exactly this. (R. V01.

ﬁnding should not be disturbed on appeal, as

it is

“Where discovery of a cause 0f action
date 0f discovery

fa_ct.”

DBSUTRI

“Where

there

is

When

for fraud

no dispute over any issue 0f material

accrues, the question

proper

there

pp. 369-370). This

commences
is

the statute of limitations, the

n0 evidence creating a question 0f

Bender, 13o Idaho 796, 807, 948 P.2d 151, 162 (1997) (emphasis added).

v.

Morrison Knudsen

2009, their

supported by substantial undisputed evidence.

a fact question for the jury unless there

is

I,

7,

is

Com,
is

fact regarding

when

Nerco Minerals C0.

one 0f law for determination by the court.”
140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004).

n0 genuine issue of material

fact

the cause of action

“Summary judgment

V.

is

and the only remaining questions are

questions 0f law.” Chandler V. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485, 488 (2009).

“Actual knowledge 0f the fraud can be inferred

if the

aggrieved party could have

discovered the fraud by reasonable diligence, although the Court Will hesitate to infer such

knowledge.” DBSI/TRI, 130 Idaho
that there

was n0 question of fact

legal access t0 their property

(R. V01.

I,

p. 369).

at

807, 948 P.2d at 162. In this case, the District Court found

as to the date the Davises

had actual knowledge 0f the

was over an easement from Highway

Speciﬁcally, the court found that there
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2,

fact that

and not Gray Wolf Road.

was n0 genuine dispute

that Jessica

Fairchild emailed the Davises a

p.

365,

1]

7,

2009. E.

at

11.

Based on

this

knowledge 0f the
Because

copy of the Boundary Line Survey 0n December

this fact

undisputed

the District Court found that the Davises

by the

summary judgment was

the date the DaVises’ fraud claims accrued

court, as permitted

had actual

Boundary Line Survey 0n December

facts contained Within the

was undisputed,

for determination

fact,

by Nerco. Because

this

7,

2009.

was a question of law

was purely a question of law,

appropriate despite the Davises’ jury demand.

This Court exercises free review over questions 0f law.
934, 3 1 8 P.3d 918, 924 (2014). In reviewing a motion for
liberally construes the record in favor

Guzman V.

Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,

summary judgment,

the

Supreme Court

0f the party opposing the motion and draws

Farm

inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Credit

Bank 0f Spokane

V.

all

reasonable

Stevenson, 125

Idaho 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994).

On
existed on

appeal, the Davises argue that

it

summary judgment from which

did exercise proper due diligence

was

error t0 grant

summary judgment because

a reasonable person could conclude that the Davises

when they

did not open an attachment that had something t0 d0

With a transaction they had completed two months earlier.” Appellant’s Brief,
argue that “[t]he facts 0n

summary judgment could

acted with due diligence

when

purchase 0f their home.

“facts

p. 10.

They

also

easily lead t0 the conclusion that the DaVises

they were sent the survey of the property two months after the

IQ. at p. 11.

However, the Davises completely
support their contention there

is

fail to

provide any citations t0 evidence in the record t0

evidence that “could easily lead t0 the conclusion that the Davises”
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acted With due diligence.

Moreover, n0 such

opposition t0 Tuma’s Motion for

facts

were submitted

Summary Judgment.

t0 the District

Court in

Rather, the Davises asked the District

Court, and in this appeal ask this Court, t0 draw a conﬂicting inference from the undisputed facts.

That the Davises do not dispute the District Court’s ﬁndings 0f
inferences t0 be

brief.

To

drawn from those

this end, the

The

but instead the

evidenced by the arguments put forward in their opening

Davises argue:

facts

that the

facts, is

fact,

0n summary iudgment could easily lead

DaVises did act With due diligence

when

to the conclusion

they were sent the

survey 0f the property two months after the purchase of their home.

A reasonable fact ﬁnder could conclude that

it

was not unreasonable

open an attachment from a title company and examine its
contents more than two months after you had purchased your
[to] fail t0

property.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 10. (emphasis added).

.

.

.

Furthermore, a reasonable person could conclude that a lay person

would not be able to 100k at a survey and ﬁgure out that they did not
have access 0n Gray Wolf Road. Even if the Davises had noticed
that the road shown 0n the survey did not extend t0 their home, such
would not necessarily lead a lay person to believe that they could
not use the road that existed

I_d.

at pp. 11

-

12.

When they bought the

(emphasis added).

Clearly, the Davises do not dispute receiving the email

access to their property over Gray

0f limitations accrued
the

property.

is

Wolf Road. That

a matter 0f law, for the

sum of their argument

is

trial

is

showing

that they did not

a settled fact, and as such,

When the

statute

Court, not the trier of fact, t0 decide. Rather,

that reasonable people could reach different conclusions

undisputed facts before the District Court. This argument

19

have

is

erroneous.

from the

With regard t0

the argument that a reasonable person might not necessarily understand the

Boundary Line Survey to mean the Davises did not have access over Gray Wolf Road,
is

this position

inconsistent With arguments previously and repeatedly advanced by the DaVises to the

trial court.

summary judgment,

Boundary

In their response t0 the motion for

for example, they allege that the

Line Survey “unmistakably” shows that access t0 the property was not off 0f Gray Wolf. (R. V01.

I,

p. 178,

1]

II(1)(iii)).

When

asked through discovery to provide the factual basis for their fraud claim, the

Davises provided the following sworn testimony:

A review of Article IX of the Covenants would immediately indicate
that all Roads and Easements were pursuant t0 the Exhibit A 0f the
Covenants in accordance with the Record of Survey (ROS) ﬁled 0n
5-3—95 as Instrument # 177454. A11 roads and easements shall be as

shown 0n said Plat including utilities. Said ROS plainly shows that
Gray Wolf road does not extend t0 Lot 2. Additionally Road Detail
B plainly shows that access was almost directly off Highway 2. Had

Tuma

CCRs

and assured the Davises that
he would have had
to have reviewed the ROS attached to the CCRS and referenced
explicitly in the CCRs and which plainly shows access 0f off (sic)
Highway 2, per Road Detail B, and not Via., Gray Wolf road as
shown in Road Detail A of the ROS.
there

E.

reviewed the

was nothing

t0

as stated

worry about

in that regard

at p. 68; 132.

The doctrine of judicial estoppelz prevents
district court level that the

2

The

the Davises

from taking the position

at the

CCRS and Record 0f Survey “plainly” and “unmistakably” revealed the

policies underlying preclusion 0f inconsistent positions are general considerations 0f the orderly administration

ofjustice and regard for the dignity ofjudicial proceedings

playing fast and loose with the courts
equitable doctrine invoked
(citing Rissetto V.

by a court

Because

it is

at its discretion.

Judicial estoppel

is

intended t0 protect against a litigant

intended to protect the dignity 0f the judicial process,

Sword

V.

Plumbers and Steamﬁtters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996)).
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it is

an

Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004)

alleged fraud but on appeal taking the position that a reasonable person might not understand the

import of those documents.
Thus, the only question before this Court as to whether the Davises had actual knowledge

of the contents 0f the survey

is

declined, failed, or neglected t0

The

facts in the record

whether they exercised reasonable due diligence when they

open Jessica Fairchild’s email with the attached record 0f survey.

demonstrate that the DaVises exercised n0 diligence in this regard.

The afﬁdavit of Terah Davis demonstrates
and

Jefri Davis.

(R. V01.

I,

pp. 224-225,

1}

that she

2).

was

acting

She admits

0n behalf of her parents, Debbie

that she received

and opened the email

from Jessica Fairchild and the attachment thereto which was labeled “Record 0f Survey,” but
claims that her computer crashed before she could read the attachment.

L1. at p.

228,

1]

then admits that she never attempted t0 download the attachment again. ﬂ. at pp. 228-229,

She

states that her

mother was aware of this email.

Li. at p.

229,

1]

24.

Her

father, Jefri

She

22.

1]

23.

Davis also

admits he was aware 0f the email, but makes no allegation that he took any steps t0 learn the
contents of the survey.

I_d.

at p.

251,

11

5.

The Davises merely had to read the email attachment that was
agent. Moreover,

if,

as they contend, the

sent t0

them by their closing

computer crashed, then due diligence would require that

they subsequently contact their closing agent and have her send another copy of the survey, either
electronically or

Kantola

V.

by mail, or that they order a copy from

the local

See,

Hendrickson, 52 Idaho 217, 12 P.2d 866, 869 (1932) (notice exists where the plaintiff

“has knowledge 0f circumstances such as would put a prudent
diligently

County Recorder’s Ofﬁce.

would expose

man upon inquiry and if prosecuted

the fraud”); Parish V. Page, 50 Idaho 87, 293 P. 979, 982 (1930)
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(“[K]n0wledge 0f

knowledge 0f the

facts that

would put a reasonably prudent person 0n inquiry

and will

fraud,

start the

running 0f the

is

equivalent t0

statute.”).

This concept has been eloquently explained by the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of

Clarke

V.

Ingram, 107 Ga. 565, 33 S.E. 802 (1899). In Clarke, the Georgia Supreme Court was

faced With interpreting a statute that held that
“fraudulent 0r void, unless

made

of the condition 0f the bank.”

I_d.

to

at

all

conveyances made during insolvency were

an innocent purchaser for value Without notice or knowledge
804.

The Clarke Court found

case required actual notice, rather than constructive notice.

Id.

that the statute at issue in that

However,

as explained

by

the

Clarke Court, proving actual notice does not require proof 0f actual knowledge on the part 0f the

opposing party, and one

Who

receives information and simply ignores

it,

nevertheless has actual

notice.

Looking
all

t0 the evident

purpose 0f this statute to afford protection to

persons justly entitled thereto,

we have n0

doubt that

contemplates actual, rather than merely constructive, notice. But

by no means

follows, as

is

insisted, that a

it
it

person sought t0 be

charged with such notice must be shown to have had actual

knowledge that the bank With Which he was dealing was insolvent.
The terms “knowledge” and “notice” are not synonymous 0r
interchangeable, and should not, therefore, be confounded the
one With the other. That Which clearly does not amount t0
positive knowledge may often, in a legal sense, constitute actual
notice. Accordingly, in applying a statute which contemplates that
only actual notice shall affect the rights 0f one acting in good faith,
the language used expressly 0r
the idea that he

mere

fact that

is

by necessary implication negativing

chargeable With constructive notice as well, the

he did not have precise and deﬁnite knowledge

concerning the matter in question cannot be regarded as having any
real importance Whatever.
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On the

contrary, the distinction t0 be

drawn

in a case calling for the

is that “between actual and constructive
and not between actual knowledge and constructive notice.
The difference in meaning between knowledge and notice must not
be overlooked, for it is equally important with the distinction
between the different kinds 0f notice. The fact t0 be established,
when the case requires proof 0f actual notice, is that the party
acquired his pretended rights With notice, and this may be true
although the purchase may have been made in actual ignorance of
the facts 0f which knowledge is imputed t0 the purchaser.” Wade,

application 0f such a statute

notice,

Notice (2d Ed.)

“Notice

is

§ 36a.

when one

actual

either has

knowledge 0f a

fact,

conscious 0f having the means 0f knowledge, although he

not use them. Actual notice

may be

from the

fact that

it is

evidence t0 be communicated by the

which

is

To

same

is

may

divided into express and

implied. Express notice embraces, not only What
called knowledge,

0r

may

fairly

be

derived from the highest

human

senses, but also that

communicated by direct and positive information, either
written 0r oral, from persons who are personally cognizant 0f the
fact communicated. The implication 0f notice arises When the
party t0 be charged is shown t0 have had knowledge 0f such
facts and circumstances as would lead him, by the exercise 0f
due diligence, to [have] knowledge of the principal fact.” 16 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, 790.

Wade, Notice (2d Ed.) §§ 5—8; also, section
understand how one may be
from denying actual notice when positive
[precluded]
information has been traced directly t0 him. It is not necessary
the

effect, see

11, as follows:

“It is easy t0

to invoke the doctrine 0f constructive notice in order t0 justify

holding that he will not be heard t0 deny that he understood the
import 0f what was clearly and plainly communicated. Whether
the notice has been communicated cannot be determined by the
standard 0f the recipient's stupidity 0r heedlessness. For the
reason, therefore, that ignorance of an important fact Which has been

placed Within the easy reach 0f a party imports either fraud 0r gross
negligence 0n his part, the law Will never inquire further than

show

is

by such means as are
sufﬁcient t0 convey intelligence from one human being t0 another.
It has accordingly been held that ‘When a party, having
necessary to

the giving of the notice
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knowledge 0f such

would lead any honest man, using
make further inquiries, does not make, but,

facts as

ordinary caution, t0

on the contrary, studiously avoids making, such obvious
inquiries, he must be taken t0 have notice 0f these facts Which,
if he had used such ordinary diligence, he would readily have
ascertained,”—citing Whitebread v. Jordan, I Younge & C. Exch.
303, and numerous other cases in point. It is clear, therefore, that
in n0 case should the investigation be conﬁned to an inquirv into
the actual knowledge 0f the person sought t0 be charged With
notice; the reallv important question t0 be determined in each
instance being, not what he actuallv knew, but What, under the
circumstances, he ought to have known. Passive good faith will
not serve to excuse ignorance Which is unpardonable.
.

He may

.

.

honestly believe that the notice given him, although

comes apparently from a
truth; yet, in

venturing t0 disregard the same, he acts at his

the notice given

him be

it

reliable source, is not in accord With the

legallv sufﬁcient,

peril.

I_f

matters not What

it

excuse he has t0 offer for his failure to govern himself
accordingly.

Nor

is it

always necessary that

it

be shown that he

received due notice 0f the particular facts in ignorance of which he

Claims t0 have acted, if the circumstances were such that by the
exercise 0f reasonable diligence he might have acquired knowledge
thereof
to

m,

33 S.E.

at

by pursuing

the inquiry

Which would have suggested

itself

an ordinarily cautious and prudent man.

804—05 (emphasis added).

Idaho law has adopted the reasoning 0f the Georgia Supreme Court in the Clarke decision,
in that Idaho

Code

§ 5-218(4) has

fraud causes of action begin to run

been interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court

when

the plaintiff knew, or reasonablv should

0f the facts constituting the fraud. McCorkle

112 P.3d 838, 842

(Ct.

to provide that

V.

NW. Mut.

have known,

Life Ins. C0., 141 Idaho 550, 554,

App. 2005) (emphasis added). Based upon the undisputed

record, only one conclusion can be reached

the exercise 0f due diligence,

which they

— that the Davises could have discovered

failed to perform.
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facts in the

the fraud

by

By

their

own

admission, a simple review 0f the survey would have revealed exactly the

information that they claim

Tuma

failed to disclose to them.

(R. V01.

p. 68; 132).

I,

In fact, the

Davises go to great lengths to argue that the lack of legal access to their property over Gray

Road

is

obvious from a review 0f the surveys.

IQ. at

183-186. There

is

no

Wolf

dispute, therefore, that

had the Davises simply read

their email 0r

title

company, they would have

had actual knowledge of the

legal access. Consequently, the Davises

were on actual notice of the

facts

followed up With the

underlying the alleged fraud n0 later than December

survey attached t0 the email.

At

that point, the statute

DaVises’ fraud claims expired n0 later than

December

the survey that they admit to having received

is

7,

7,

2009, whether 0r not they opened the

0f limitations began t0 accrue, and the
2012. Whether they actually reviewed

immaterial t0 the question 0f whether the statute

0f limitations began t0 accrue and subsequently expired.

The

District

Court properly concluded

to exercise reasonable diligence.

that,

upon these undisputed

facts, the

Davises failed

Under these circumstances, and in accordance with the

rule

from

DBSI/TRI, the District Court was permitted to infer that the Davises had actual or constructive

knowledge of the
under

I.C. §

t0 infer

case.

facts that

form the basis of their fraud claims sufﬁcient

5-218(4) as of December

such knowledge,

it

7,

2009.

And While DBSI/TRI instructs the

does not proscribe such an inference

The Davises should not beneﬁt from

for their claims t0 accrue

their willful failure

When

court t0 hesitate

appropriate. This

and refusal

t0 procure a

is

such a

copy 0f the

Boundary Line Survey, particularly When they had the means of discovering those claims delivered
directly to their email inbox.
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There are sound policy reasons for the application 0f statutes 0f limitation in matters such
as these. In

Renner V. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838—39, 475 P.2d 530, 532—33 (1969),
It is

it

was

stated:

eminently clear that statutes of limitation were intended t0

prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning

which persons

been thrown off their guard for want
are, t0 be sure, a bane t0 those who
are neglectful 0r dilatory in the prosecution 0f their legal rights. As
a statute 0f repose, they afford parties needed protection against the
necessity of defending claims which, because of their antiquity,
interested have

of reasonable prosecution. They

would place

the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases

how resolutely unfair

award one Who has wilfully 0r
an opportunity to enforce an
unfresh claim against a party Who is left t0 shield himself from
liability With nothing more than tattered or faded memories,
misplaced or discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses.”
T0 those Who are unduly tardy in enforcing their known rights, the
carelessly slept

statute

on

it

would be

to

his legal rights

0f limitations operates to extinguish the remedies; in

their right ceases to create a legal obligation

moral obligation

may

arise in the aid

and

effect,

in lieu thereof a

0f Which courts Will not lend

their assistance.

The Davises put forward no evidence or argument below or on appeal

t0 support a reversal

0f the District Court’s ﬁnding that the DaVises had actual or constructive knowledge of the
constituting their fraud claims

December
statute

7,

2009.

on the date they received the email from Jessica

facts

Fairchild,

Consequently, this Court should afﬁrm the District Court’s ruling that the

0f limitations expired 0n the DaVises’ fraud claims three years

later,

on December

7,

2012.

The District Court Properly Found that the Davises had Constructive
that Gray WolfRoad did not Provide Access t0 Their Properly.

3.

Knowledge

This Court need not reach the issue of Whether the Davises had constructive notice of the
fraud claims, as

it is

obvious that they had actual notice sufﬁcient for the statute 0f limitations t0
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have expired 0n December

7,

2012. However, in the event this Court ﬁnds that the Davises did

not have actual notice, the District Court’s ruling that they had constructive notice from the record

should be upheld.

The

parties

do not dispute that the Davises received by email a copy 0f the Boundary Line

Survey, and that the record of survey, the

documents
11).

The

in the public records

parties also

CCRS, and the Boundary Line Survey were

of Boundary County as 0f October

1,

all

2009. (R. V01.

I,

I_d.

at

ﬂ

10.

From

facts contained within those

documents 0n the date they acquired the property, October

1,

have been recorded. While

it is

interests t0 a prospective

the concept of constructive notice

is far

Under binding Idaho precedent,

at 554,

112 P.3d

recorded

is

not limited merely t0

true that I.C. § 55-811 imparts constructive notice

buyer

to protect holders

0f prior recorded

interests,

broader.

the statute 0f limitations for a claim for fraud begins to run

When the plaintiffknew, 0r reasonablv should have known, 0f the
McCorkle, 141 Idaho

11

2009.

The concept 0f constructive knowledge 0r constructive notice

0f adverse recorded

365,

these undisputed facts, the District Court

found that the Davises were 0n constructive notice 0f the

that

p.

d0 not dispute that the surveys show that Gray Wolf Road does not provide

legal access t0 the DaVises’ property.

documents

recorded

at

facts constituting the fraud.

842 (emphasis added). The question, therefore,

whether the Davises actually reviewed the survey that was indisputably emailed

is

not

t0 them, but

Whether under these circumstances, they reasonably should have known 0f the facts constituting
the fraud.
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The

The documents

District Court’s decision in this regard is sound.

that reveal the actual

location 0f the legal access t0 the DaVises property are recorded, and pursuant t0 Idaho law, “a

purchaser
fact

is

charged With every fact shown by the records and

is

presumed

to

know

which an examination suggested by the records would have disclosed.”

every other

W. Wood

Investments, Inc. V. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 86, 106 P.3d 401, 412 (2005). Additionally, in this case,
the Davises actually received the survey which,

by

their

own

admission, clearly indicates the

location 0f the legal access. These circumstances can be labeled actual knowledge, actual notice,

constructive knowledge, or constructive notice, but in any case, these facts clearly support the

Court’s ﬁnding that the DaVises reasonably should have

It is at

that point that the statute

known of the

facts constituting the fraud.

0f limitations began t0 run, and has, in this case, long since expired.

The District Court Decision Must Be Upheld Due t0 the Appellant ’s Failure
t0 Support the Elements ofits Claimfor Fraud in Response t0 Respondent’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.

4.

Alternatively, this Court can uphold the District Court’s ruling

0n the grounds

that the

Davises failed to come forward with evidence supporting the elements of their fraud claims in
response t0 Tuma’s Motion for
question because

It is

it

Summary Judgment.

found that the claims were barred by the

District Court never reached this

statute

of limitations.

well settled that this Court can afﬁrm the decision of a lower court on alternative

theories than those given below.

P.3d 868, 873 (2003). In

Nampa

this matter,

& Meridian Irr.

Tuma

Dist. V. Mussell,

139 Idaho 28, 33, 72

ﬁled a Celotex-style Motion for

on the DaVises’ fraud and constructive fraud claims.

Tuma

The

argued that there was n0 evidence that

(R. V01.

Tuma knew

28

I,

p. 61).

Summary Judgment

Relevant to

his statements

were

this appeal,

false,

which

is

generally considered the fourth element of a fraud claim.

to the

motion by arguing

that this element

I_d.

at pp.

73-76.

The Davises responded

may be proven either by evidence that the
were ignorant of its

the statement to be false or evidence that they

truth.

then argued to the District Court that the evidence in this case showed that
to the truth

Wolf Road. m.

of his statements concerning Gray

at p. 190,

1]

knew

186-187. They

at pp.

I_d.

speaker

Tuma was

ignorant as

4 (“Tuma was ignorant

0f the truth 0f his. .misstatements”).
.

Tuma

responded that the Davises were applying a negligence standard t0 the scienter

element 0f fraud.

I_d.

at p. 305.

simply mistaken as to a fact

where the speaker claims
that

Tuma

if that

that

person

T0

that,

under Idaho law,

unaware

is

that

he 0r she

he or she knows something t0 be

he or she had no basis for claiming

to this Court’s decision in

noted

it

t0

be

true.

it is

is

true,

not fraud

mistaken.

when

if

It is

a person

is

only fraud

the speaker

is

aware

This difference was explained by reference

Holderman:

support an action based on a false representation, scienter must

be proved; that is, the representation must have been false, t0 the
knowledge of the person who made it, or must have been made, as
apositive assertion calculated t0 convey the impression that he

actual knowledge of its truth,

had n0 such knowledge. If
representation t0 be true, he

when

in fact

had

he was conscious he

the speaker honestly believed his
is

not

liable;

an honest mistake, 0r

error in judgment, being regarded as insufficient grounds 0n

which

t0

base a charge offraud. 20 Cyc. 24. It is true that, if a
is made recklessly, Without any knowledge of its truth

representation

0r falsity, an action will

made

in the belief that

lie,

it is

but not Where such representation
true,

and such belief

is

is

founded upon

reasonable grounds.
Id. at pp.

305-306

(citing

Johnson

V.

Holderman, 30 Idaho 691, 167

(emphasis added».
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P.

1030, 1031 (1917)

To withstand the dismissal 0fthe DaVises’
would have had

fraud claims on summaryjudgment, the DaVises

to submit admissible evidence demonstrating that

statements were false, or that he

was aware

that

he did not

Tuma was

know Whether

either

aware his

his representation

regarding access was true or false, but nevertheless represented that he understood the location of
the access.

The record

is

devoid of any such evidence. At most, the record shows that

Tuma

misunderstood the location 0f the legal access t0 the property.

Nor is
there

was

instance,

there evidence that

Tuma made the

statements about Gray

substantial evidence indicating that this

was

1H 9—17). Rather

84,

11

12.

it

the easement ceases.” (R. V01.

continues t0 the Subject Property, right t0 the DaVises’ property.

There were n0 other roads built to the property. Boundary County

Gray Wolf Road going to

by Boundary County

is

as

the road access t0 the subject property. For

Gray Wolf Road does not physically end Where

85,

Wolf Road recklessly,

aerial

I,

pp. 84-

I_d.

at p.

maps show

the property, and the property address for the Subj ect Property assigned

984 Gray Wolf Road.

I_d.

at pp. 84-85,

W

16, 11.

Despite these

facts,

however, the Davises did not have legal access over Gray Wolf Road, but through a different
easement.

This evidence does not support a ﬁnding that

concluding that Gray

At

Wolf Road was

the hearing

Tuma was

reckless in erroneously

the legal access t0 the DaVises’ property.

0n Tuma’s Motion

evidence supporting their allegation that

for

Summary Judgment,

Tuma made

impression that he had actual knowledge of its

knowledge, sufﬁcient t0 meet the standard

truth,

n0

a positive assertion calculated to convey the

when in fact he was conscious he had n0 such

set forth in
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the DaVises put forward

Holderman. Rather, the

facts in the record

support only a ﬁnding that
not.

Tuma honestly believed his

Consequently, Holderman instructs that

Tuma

representation to be true,

is

when they were

not liable; an honest mistake, 0r error in

judgment, being regarded as insufﬁcient grounds on which to base a charge of fraud. Holderman,

30 Idaho 691, 167

P. at 1031.

In fact, in the DaVises’

Appeal

Tuma was

admit several times that

Brief, they

simply

mistaken in his belief of the location of the legal access:

Tuma

failed to notice that the road that both

home

believed t0 provide access t0 the

Tuma believed
on

the property

his investigation

The information Tuma reviewed

home

.

.

.

.

.

shows

prior t0 closing

is

not from Grey

but from another point off 0f the highway.
this fact as

.

had access Via Gray Wolf Road based

0f the property.

access t0 the Davis’s (sic)

he and the Davises

did not in fact d0 so.

(sic)

Tuma

that the

Wolf Road

failed t0 notice

he readily admits.”

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The record before
their fraud claims.

is

the Court, and the arguments advanced

At most,

now barred by the

statute

the Davises

had a claim against

by

the Davises do not support

Tuma for negligence, but such a claim

of limitations, as explained in Section B.1, above.

The Respondent respectfully submits

that this Court should

ﬁnd that Tuma met his burden

0n summary judgment of showing an absence 0f evidence on the knowledge element of the
DaVises’ fraud claim. Pursuant to Celotex, the burden then shifted to the Davises to

with evidence that

Tuma knew

his statements

disregard as to the truth 0f the matters.

were

false 0r that

The record shows
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come forward

he made them With reckless

that the DaVises

were unable

t0

meet

this
fraud on
thisburden,
andthis
burden,and
thisCourt
Courtshould
shouldaffirm
Court’sdismissal
afﬁrmthe
theDistrict
DistrictCourt's
dismissalof
ofthe
theclaims
claimsfor
fOr fraud 0n
these
the
thesealternative
alternativegrounds.
grounds. Additionally,
Additionally,because
becausethe
therecord
recorddoes
doesnot
notsupport
supportaaclaim
claimof
offraud,
fraud,

the

Davises'
Davises’argument
Tuma’smisrepresentations
argumentthat
thatTuma's
misfepresentationsprohibits
prohibitsaafinding
ﬁndingof
ofconstructive
constructivenotice
noticealso
also
fails.
fails.

C.
C.

Conclusion
Conclusion

For
Court affirm
Forthe
thereasons
reasonsset
setforth
forthherein,
theDefendants
herein,the
Defendantsrespectfully
respectfullyrequest
requestthat
thatthis
this Court afﬁrm
the
claims for
Court’sdenial
theDistrict
DistrictCourt's
denialof
Plaiﬁtiffs’ motion
ofthe
thePlaintiffs'
motionto
toamend
amendand
andthe
thedismissal
dismissalof
oftheir
their claims for
fraud,
fraud, constructive
constructivefraud,
andnegligence.
fraud, and
negligence.
9th day of
DATED
DATEDthis
this 9th
2019.
August, 2019.
day ofAugust,

Berg,

McLau

'

& Nelson, CHTD

yﬁa
,

. Toby
McLaughlin
Toby McLaughlin
Attorney
at Law
Attorney at
Law
.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ihereby
foregoing

certify that

on the

9th

day of August, 2019,

I

served a true and correct copy of the

RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF by the method indicated below,

and addressed

the following:

Arthur M. Bistline

[x]

iCourt: service@bistlinelaw.com

BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1205 N.

3rd Street

Coeur d’Alene, ID 838 14

/s/ Brenda

Burnett

Brenda Burnett
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